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
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
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**MOBILIZATION AND DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
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**LINE ITEM BUDGETING IN THE CONTEXT OF
MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT**

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**ABSTRACT OF STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES**

NAME OF RESEARCHER (S) CDR Robert E. Brown	TITLE OF REPORT Line Item Budgeting in the Context of Mobilization Management
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT unclassified	REPORT NUMBER N

ABSTRACT

PROBLEM STATEMENT: The Reagan administration Emergency Mobilization Preparedness goals, as enumerated in National Security Decision Directive Number 47, depend upon moral suasion of the Executive Department for success. With one minor exception, there are no specific budget line items suitable for audit devoted to mobilization preparedness.

CONCLUSIONS/FINDINGS:

1. Mobilization preparedness is a long term process that will require continuity through several Presidential terms if the program is to be successful.
2. Monitoring of progress in the current program depends solely upon accountability within the circle of Presidential political appointees.
3. Mobilization preparedness needs to be made a permanent part of the bureaucratic institution in order to ensure continuity.
4. Mobilization capabilities and sustainability must be frequently discussed in the public forum. Current "bean counting" of major weapons systems is at best a superficial treatment of war fighting capability.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Require line item budgeting for mobilization for all Departments and Agencies tasked with program responsibilities.
2. Conduct a yearly audit of expenditures versus accomplishments.
3. Hold mobilization managers and staffs accountable for results.

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DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The first Post-World War II mobilization exercise, NIFTY NUGGET, was conducted in 1978. The results showed that the long reliance on nuclear deterrence had destroyed the infrastructure of administrative procedure, knowledge, and experience required to mobilize the nation for war. In recognition of the problem, President Reagan initiated revitalization of Emergency Mobilization Preparedness through National Security Decision Directive Number 47. An Emergency Mobilization Planning Board, composed of Department Secretaries and Agency heads and chaired by the National Security Advisor, was tasked to carry out the intent of the NSDD-47. However, despite this strong Presidential interest, implementation has been slow.

NSDD-47 calls for marked changes in national policy. Any significant change always requires time and constant emphasis to accomplish. Naturally, there is always some resistance, and in this case, it can be expected due to divergent priorities within the National Defense organization, political concerns that a strong military establishment able to fully control the economy on a moment's notice is potentially dangerous, and finally the well established practice within the military services of opting for purchase of major end items at the expense of sustainability and mobilization capability.

To counter these problems there will have to be a conscious effort made to staff the mobilization preparedness organization

with the "best and the brightest" while backing them with the budgetary clout to carry out the program even in the face of resistance. For this reason it is recommended that a budget line item for mobilization preparedness be established in every Department and Agency. This practice will help to establish the mobilization readiness concept as part of the fundamental government framework and will allow audit of the results on a yearly basis.

It is further recommended that the JCS be given a stronger role in the decision process, and it is suggested that a joint working group composed of staff members from the offices of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Mobilization and the JCS be tasked to work on the problem to develop a long term strategy acceptable to the majority of parties within the Department of Defense.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

"It is of immense importance that the soldier, high or low, whatever rank he has, should not have to encounter in war those things which when seen for the first time, set him in astonishment and perplexity; if he has only met with them one single time before, even by that he is half acquainted with them."¹

Mobilization exercise NIFTY NUGGET, conducted in 1978, was the first of its kind to be held since the end of World War II. Post exercise analyses of the results showed that in all probability the United States would have suffered a disastrous defeat with the likely loss of the entire 200,000 man force sent to Europe in the gameplay. Clearly, in the words of Clausewitz, we had encountered things which caused "astonishment and perplexity." We found ourselves in a position analogous to the neophyte big game hunter who has bought shiny new equipment from a catalogue, practiced shooting on a target range, boasted of his prowess, but suddenly and unexpectedly, finds himself thrust into the real jungle with insufficient ammunition and sustenance while accompanied by a large safari staff equally unfamiliar with the terrain and realities of jungle existence. We were neither mentally nor materielly prepared to overcome the rapidly developing problems encountered in the exercise. Multiple unresolved minor problems snowballed into massive bottlenecks that would have rapidly led to defeat in battle. The results were particularly alarming when one considers that all exercises are simple compared to the

unforeseen and unpredictable events and problems encountered in real operations.

In order to evaluate progress and to acquire more in depth insight for all involved, NIFTY NUGGET was followed by large mobilization exercises in 1980 and 1982. Each succeeding exercise was more comprehensive and involved more government agencies than its predecessor. While many problems were solved, we found some that were persistent and that defied correction. Examples include, but are not limited to, ammunition shortages, staff unfamiliarity with a mobilization problem, strategic deployment force shortfalls, and ill defined inter-agency bounds of responsibility.

The primary contributor to the deterioration of comprehensive mobilization planning was the advent of the nuclear weapon age in 1945. As the sole owner of the atomic bomb, backed by a demonstrated readiness to use it to conserve American lives, the United States had unchallengeable war fighting superiority. We had the ability to destroy any opponent, without any need to mobilize, merely by maintaining the relatively few and inexpensive platforms needed to deliver the weapons. Though the Soviets developed their own thermonuclear capability, we were able to maintain an overall nuclear superiority that would have made a Soviet attack suicidal. It is a particularly interesting paradox that at the time of our greatest advantage, we expended our greatest energies in preparing detailed mobilization studies and plans. The massive organizational momentum built up during our hard won, and sometimes bitter,

experience in World War II continued to roll on despite the marked change in strategic realities.

As we advanced into the decade of the 1970's, it became increasingly evident that the Soviet strategic nuclear capability had approached parity with the West. War planning, ever a complicated business, became a quagmire of contradictions. The small (a relative term used in this context as a comparison to major war needs) active duty forces were backed by even smaller Reserve and National Guard assets. Pulling the nuclear trigger risked the very existence of American society; not using nuclear arms meant sure tactical disaster in a Central European conflict. Whether any president has the nerve to initiate a theater nuclear exchange in the face of possible rapid escalation into use of strategic forces remains to be seen. However, it is likely that the risk would be deemed too great. The NATO military establishment would then be tasked with fighting a prolonged conventional war. The massive Soviet conventional forces, conveniently for the Warsaw Pact, already located upon the Eurasian land mass, would have to be countered with equally massive NATO conventional forces dependent upon a three thousand mile sea line of communications for the bulk of its combat support. This level of effort would require mobilization of the entire nation. NIFTY NUGGET, as stated above, demonstrated that we were not prepared to meet that challenge as the decade of the 1970's drew to a close.

The problems listed above were clearly recognized by the incoming Reagan administration. Therefore, the President initiated

National Security Decision Directive 47 (NSDD-47) which states:

"It is the policy of the United States to have an emergency mobilization preparedness capability that will ensure that government at all levels, in partnership with the private sector and the American people, can respond decisively and effectively to any major national emergency with defense of the United States as the first priority."²

Despite NSDD-47 and the strong will of the Reagan administration, our national defense organizations have been slow to change direction. Almost two entire generations of military and civilian defense experts have reached career maturity relying upon the short nuclear war theory as the cornerstone of all defense structuring. Just as the World War II leadership was slow to recognize the change in strategic realities, the current bureaucracy has gained momentum that will not be changed without considerable pressure, bargaining, and compromise. National mobilization is an extremely complex business which is further hampered by the roadblocks and controversy inherent to a democratic society. Since the entire population and economy are involved to a greater or lesser degree, the whole federal, state, and local government structure must take steps to meet the challenge. Perfect national defense preparedness is ultimately unattainable in the real world of peacetime budget constraints. However, President Reagan recognized the value of limited investment in advance planning and materiel preparation when he stated in NSDD-47:

"In the overall context of the President's budget and current regulatory, budgeting and legislative review processes, each Department and Agency will program and budget funds and personnel for these preparedness

activities which are integral to assigned missions and functions."³

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the desirability of identifying mobilization preparedness funds as a specific line item within appropriated budgets.

CHAPTER II

EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS: MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES AND OBSTACLES THERETO

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine the stated overall management techniques established to carry out the purpose of NSDD-47 and some of the factors that will work against successful implementation in either the short or long term.

THE METHODS

The National Plan of Action for Emergency Preparedness is the comprehensive initial implementation guidance that accompanied NSDD-47. It specifies tasks to be completed, the agency or agencies directly responsible, and the deadline dates for task completion. It states:

"The implementation measures covered by this national plan of action for emergency mobilization preparedness are essential first steps in achieving an effective emergency mobilization preparedness capability. ...Each department and agency will program and budget the funds and personnel necessary to accomplish the measures described in this National Plan of Action. The resources to fund the emergency mobilization preparedness measures in the National Plan of Action (NPOA) are to be accorded priority status by each Department and Agency during the budget process."⁴

To provide continuity of emphasis and monitor progress, the NPOA further states:

"The Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB, composed of National Security Advisor, Department Secretaries and Agency heads) will monitor implementation of the plan. It will resolve issues within the framework of current administration policy. Any

issue which cannot be resolved by the Board will be referred to the National Security Council for resolution and Presidential decision. ...I direct the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to advise and assist me in the implementation of this Plan. He will report to me periodically on the performance of those responsibilities by the Department Secretaries and Agency heads who have responsibilities assigned in the implementation measures in this Plan."5

THE OBSTACLES

The quotes cited above would seem to provide unequivocal direction to be carried out, as a priority matter, by all Departments and Agencies. However, since most people recognize that any ambitious project takes years to carry out, there are very real potential obstacles that could disrupt or destroy the entire effort. Some of these are described below.

Executive Leadership Change - Senior level political appointees in leadership positions within the Executive Department frequently leave government service or move to different positions. The reasons are varied and are of no consequence in this study. The key fact is that change is continuous, and every change requires some level of training and a period of familiarization before the new leader can take actual leadership control. Even when the appointee is familiar with the agency and its policies, he is naturally encumbered by his own set of personal convictions, practices, and priorities built up through his life. These may or may not be compatible with Presidential priorities and desires. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that mobilization readiness will not be high on the personal priority list of every appointee. One can also assume that there are more than enough political pres-

asures and emergent crises to provide alibis for low level interest and less than meaningful accomplishment.

Divergent Priorities - The National Plan of Action has four pages devoted to purely military mobilization matters. The entire document is over one hundred pages long and a good deal of the preparedness matters deal with earthquakes, floods, and other national disasters. Many of the tasks make no significant contribution toward military mobilization. Faced with budget and staffing constraints, an Agency or Department could be led to diligently carry out a portion of the Plan of Action dear to its own interests while neglecting actions deemed more important by military mobilization planners. Since most of the implementation measures listed in the Plan of Action are purely planning functions, and since many of them are not due as completed actions until the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1983 or later, there is ample room for delays and "misunderstandings" of priorities and purpose. Any scent in the political winds indicating strong opposition in the 1984 presidential election could further aggravate the priorities issue. Preparations of mobilization are not as politically potent as "down home" flood, fire, and earthquake relief efforts.

Political Resistance - Ever since the founding of our Union, many intelligent and experienced men have argued the relative merits of various methods of organizing for national defense. When the Constitution was presented to the nation for ratification, there were fears voiced by some that a strong Federal Government, with the ability to maintain standing armed forces, would eventually be

a threat to the freedoms of individual Americans. To illustrate that point one needs only to examine the original Pennsylvania and North Carolina constitutions which said: "As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up."⁶ In addition, the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland, in their own Bills of Rights said: "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up without the consent of the legislature."⁷ The proponents of this view argued that the new federal Constitution should specifically prohibit standing armies. However, the defenders of the Constitution, in a series of newspaper articles which have come to be known as the Federalist Papers, successfully presented a counter argument. They stated that the realities of the world, particularly the danger of European powers allied with hostile Indian nations, required some level of active armed forces paid and supported by the Federal Government. It was their contention that militia units would never be an adequate substitute for regular forces able to maintain continuous watch in areas subject to the greatest threat.

Although the Federalists were able to win their point, the underlying fear of central military control of large standing forces persisted. Therefore, when one considers that effective military mobilization of the nation will impact upon every aspect of the country, and that a long conventional war would likely lead to economic controls and limits placed upon individual freedoms, it is not surprising that peacetime mobilization preparedness activi-

ties are not met with extreme warmth in the Congress.

Military Resistance - War fighting is the primary purpose of military forces. That purpose may be overtly demonstrated in actual battle or implicitly threatened through the ability to rapidly mobilize for war. However, mobilization preparedness and combat sustainability seldom top the priority list of the military services. Every service has been inclined to spend its budgets on what are termed "big ticket items" at the expense of combat sustainability and mobilization preparedness. Aircraft, ships, and armored vehicles appeal to the eye of the public and the press considerably more than the missiles and shells used by these platforms in combat. They also offer command opportunities for the military officer establishment that would not be adequately met by the substitution of a billet as Officer in Charge of an obscure ammunition dump. The Services' emphasis on showpiece hardware is not ameliorated by public relations and budgetary tactics within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Every comparison that is ever made between Warsaw Pact and NATO military powers is always summed up by a chart comparing numbers of men, ships, tanks, and aircraft. There is an implicit understanding that there are ample spare parts and ammunition to sustain all these forces in the field for an indefinite period. Perhaps it would be worth the effort to place more emphasis on sustainability factors when national defense is discussed in a public forum.

Mobilization preparedness implies the ability to call large numbers of Reservists to active duty on short notice. A Central

European conflict would require immediate activation of virtually every Reserve and National Guard unit. However, truly prepared Reserve forces are a subtle threat to the status quo of the active duty military establishment. Manpower costs, both for active duty and retired personnel, are perennial sources of concern for both the Executive and Legislative branches of government. If, through substantial investment, Reserve and National Guard units were brought to a level of readiness comparable to the best active units, then there might be considerable pressure brought to bear to further reduce the active force level. In order to reduce overall manpower costs, one might have to search diligently to find an active duty officer who is enthusiastic about the elimination of his unit and billet in favor of a Reserve unit.

Executive Department Resistance - The quotes cited at the beginning of this chapter would seem to indicate a Presidential desire for every Department and Agency to quantify the level of budgetary and personnel effort to be devoted to mobilization preparedness. However, when the subject of establishing a line item for mobilization in the budgets of every Department or Agency responsible for carrying out a portion of the National Plan of Action was discussed with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) personnel, it was met with stiff resistance. The opposition of these OMB representatives centered around two main points: first, that a specific line item would be interpreted as micromanagement and second, that having a line item would subject it to the possibility of be-

ing reduced or eliminated during the Congressional review process. Unless this opposition is changed, monitoring of mobilization readiness must depend solely upon the will and interest of the EMPB. There is to be no budget audit trail subject to annual review.

This chapter opened with a series of quotes from a draft copy of the National Plan of Action and then proceeded to discuss a few factors that will work against attaining the stated objectives. Despite the difficulties, however, the subject must be pursued. The next chapter discusses the roles of some of the key Agencies involved in mobilization planning.

CHAPTER III

PRINCIPLE AGENCIES IN DEVELOPING MOBILIZATION READINESS

INTRODUCTION

World War II was the last time the United States faced the absolute need to mobilize the nation for war. One author, in examining that war, states:

"... The strategic choice had been made for a long war in which the intention would be to maximize all available production resources in order to out-produce the enemy. The implications of this decision for both the domestic and the international economies were only dimly perceived but the die, had, nevertheless, been irrevocably cast for fundamental changes in both. Most economic preparations for the war to come continued to be mainly concerned with avoiding inflation and the disruption of trade, business and social life. Their general drift was negative, concerned more with avoiding problems than with solving them. Strategic decisions had run in advance of economic ones; with each step toward a prolonged war of mass production economic thinking had reluctantly to bring itself to focus on the problems which such a war implied. It meant in the end an extension of the administration into almost every aspect of social existence and a total priority for "war" production over every aspect of "civilian" production."⁸

The above quote concerned the United Kingdom during World War II, but there are strong similarities to our present planning. Current initiatives within FEMA and DOD will be discussed in this chapter.

THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

As stated in Chapter II, the President, through NSDD-47, has directed all Federal Agencies to begin the steps needed to ensure mobilization preparedness. FEMA is responsible for civil

emergency preparedness measures. In the event of national emergency, the Agency is also to act as a unifying point to determine allocation of critical resources between the military and civilian sectors. The central tone of FEMA's planning closely parallels the experience of the United Kingdom at the beginning of World War II. The Draft Resources Mobilization Plan, published in October 1982 in preparation for REX-82-B (a mobilization exercise conducted in conjunction with exercise PROUD SABER) states:

"The civilian economy will be sustained at as high a level as possible while providing necessary manpower, goods, and services to meet military and related defense requirements. Resource controls will be used to support defense programs and will be expanded only when warranted by emergency conditions to cover other programs essential to defense, economic stability and security of the nation. That emergency management of the economy will be carried out by exception only and not comprehensively. No interruption of normal business practices will be attempted as long as military mobilization requirements are met. In other words, don't fix it if it works."⁹

A comparison between FEMA's policy and that of the United Kingdom cited at the beginning of this chapter leads one to believe that FEMA has not really examined the problem in depth. Should the Warsaw Pact put its 200 plus divisions into battle in Central Europe, we would be forced to immediately take rather Draconian measures to amass the military might needed to win a conventional war. However, despite the general policy statement, the FEMA draft plan does provide a starting point for further study. If this plan, or a similar final directive is followed through with extensive detailed planning based upon pro-

jected requirements provided by the Department of Defense, then it could significantly influence the outcome of a future engagement with the Soviets. However, if the documented plan is given a low priority as compared to earthquake, hurricane, flood and other disaster preparations, then at the time of need there will be a "too late" scramble to accomplish the planning that needs to be done now.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Meaningful overall resource allocation planning by FEMA will depend upon the accuracy of needs identified by the Department of Defense. The preliminary Department of Defense Master Mobilization Plan was issued in June 1982. It is a comprehensive document detailing the responsibilities of 20 DOD (with all the services counted as one component) and two non-DOD component organizations. Also included are a set of decision options concerning decisions to be made by the President, Congress, or Secretary of Defense. Decisions within the purview of lesser parties are left out and it is stipulated that they should be included in the planning of the appropriate Agency.

At the time of the writing of this paper, the following sections of the Master Mobilization Plan were listed as "to be published" and were not available to the author:

- Budgeting and Funding
- Guidance and Administrative Requirements
- Exercises, Tests, and Evaluation
- Mobilization Planning Management System
- Federal Agency Mobilization Roles
- Mobilization Organizations

The lack of information concerning the budgeting plan and the man-

agement system cripples the entire document. The recently established Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mobilization, who reports to the Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, will provide oversight to military mobilization planning. The position is potentially the single most powerful mobilization center within the Department of Defense. However, the Mobilization Planning Management System will have to give him sufficient power to overcome what Clausewitz called "friction" within the DOD organization. He said, "The military machine, the Army (substitute DOD) and all belonging to it, is in fact simple, and appears on this account easy to manage. But let us reflect that no part of it is in one piece, that it is composed entirely of individuals, each of which keeps up its own friction in all directions."¹⁰ The overall mobilization readiness structure is huge and made up of numerous component organizations, all generating their own friction. Shortly after General David C. Jones retired in June 1982, he wrote an article for the New York Times magazine. In part, he stated that the Defense Budget "... is derived primarily from the disparate desires of the individual Services rather than from a well integrated plan based on a serious examination of the alternatives by the civilian and military leadership working together."¹¹ He was correct, but if serious efforts are made to implement the entire Department of Defense Master Mobilization Plan, we could solve a significant portion of that problem.

CHAPTER IV

RECOMMENDATIONS

All power in a large bureaucratic organization depends upon five key factors. They are intellect, personal energy and unflagging dedication of the component staff members combined with the personal influence of the component leader within the highest level of decision making and backed by the monetary clout to carry out plans even in the face of resistance. The following recommendations all aim to support this hypothesis.

1. Establish a line item for mobilization in the budget of every Department or Agency assigned mobilization responsibilities - While it is true that this will be perceived to be micromanagement by some, and it will expose the program to the risk of budget cutting during the Congressional review process, the risks should be taken. A priority project, in either government or industry always receives the attention of the highest levels of management. If the need for mobilization preparedness is important enough, and this author believes it is, then it is worthy of a yearly battle with the Congress.
2. EMPB should conduct a yearly audit of mobilization preparedness activities - Given the adoption of a specific budgeting approach, a yearly review of Agency goals versus accomplishments should be held. This would also be an appropriate time to establish a priority list of proposed goals for the subsequent year.
3. Hold mobilization managers and staffs accountable for results - A priority project requires quality personnel to ensure maximum creativity and quality of product. Since mobilization will not be inherently high on the priority list of every Agency, there is a danger of staff assignments to these responsibilities becoming a backwater dumping ground for non productive personnel. This must be avoided.
4. Change our style of analysis in the public forum when

comparing Warsaw Pact versus NATO capabilities - Continued reliance on the shop worn tank for tank and plane for plane graphs will not generate a strong public understanding of the mobilization and sustainability problem. We must discuss sustainability factors such as ammunition stocks and we cannot afford to avoid analysis of the respective abilities to replace combat losses of equipment, both in the near and long range term. Public support, and thereby Congressional backing of the preparedness effort, will be more likely.

5. Strengthen the role of the JCS in overall mobilization planning - The 1982 DOD Master Mobilization Plan tasks the JCS with oversight of the services mobilization plans. However, there is a consistent disparity between strategic plans and the means to carry out the plan. Many distinguished writers have cited the problems between OSD, the JCS, and the services. These internecine pitched battles must be reduced to friendly skirmishes between mutually supportive groups. Since it is the military that will literally risk life and natural survival during a war, it is fitting for the military to be the primary architect for mobilization and strategic planning. A budget assignment to a joint OSD (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Mobilization) and JCS staff working group might force a better understanding between these key defense groups. The yearly EMPB audit would lay bare and resolve issues that are "non-negotiable."

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